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Abstract: The paper provides a reading of Richard Shusterman’s 2016 The 
Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life. I contend that this book, 
that brings together philosophy, literature and photography, provides a compelling, 
albeit implicit, expression of two of the challenges that somaesthetics poses to 
philosophy – first, a rethinking of the foundations of subjectivity in the Western 
philosophical tradition by way of the concept of the alter ego; and second, a challenge 
to the received perception of the nature and relation of philosophy and art.  
 
There is nothing in theory, and certainly nothing in experience, to support 
the extraordinary judgment that it is the truth about himself that is the 
easiest for a person to know. — Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit 
It was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split 
— D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix 
 
Introduction 
Blurring the lines between literature and philosophy, Richard Shusterman’s 2016 The 
Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life, is, I contend, an attempt 
to rethink the foundations of subjectivity from a life-affirming and somatic perspective 
consistent with his somaesthetic agenda. The book is presented as an “experience” – 
in the sense of “experimentation and risk”1 - and that experimentation can be read, in 
my view, as an oblique dissection of the modern ego in order to critique the 
metaphysics that undergirds it. 
                                                            
1 Shusterman, Richard, The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life (Paris: Hermann Éditeurs, 
2016), 13. 
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Specifically, in my reading, Shusterman’s book takes a place in the long series of 
attempts to critique modern subjectivity, and it achieves this by means of an 
exploration of an alter ego – l’homme en Or (the Man in Gold). The book becomes a 
place to unmask, in a quintessentially Nietzschean fashion, the fragility of the 
philosophical foundations of the “subject” – that (white, male) subject who aims, 
amongst other things, “to bring light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the 
earth.”2 I demonstrate in this paper how the figure of Shusterman’s Man in Gold stands 
as a challenge to the positivistic vision of the subject understood in terms of unity, 
rationality, free will and self-control. In addition, I posit that this juxtaposition of ego 
and alter ego can be also understood as an implicit commentary on the relationship of 
philosophy (the ego) and its “rival” art (the alter ego). 
 
It must be noted at the outset that my reading of The Adventures of the Man in Gold 
in this paper cannot address the myriad other philosophical questions I think are raised 
either directly or obliquely by the book. These include the capacity of the self for 
aesthetic experience; the “ethical consequences in opening oneself to possession and 
transformation;”3 the value and nature of “limit experiences;” the relationship between 
art and pornography; the question of difference and belonging; the problematic nature 
of knowledge in the context of the aesthetic; as well as the existential dimensions of 
understanding the self as being revealed though art. Although all of these questions 
stand in an intimate relationship to the two themes addressed in this paper, they 
deserve separate and sustained treatment due to their complexity and significance, 
and so are not addressed in any detail here. 
 
The paper takes the following form: I begin with a brief history of the “double” or alter 
ego, which I interpret as a challenge to the concept of self as single, homogenous, 
rational and free, and situate this reading within the philosophical debate on the 
“death” of the subject. This is followed by a section in which I discuss Shusterman’s 
broader understanding of the self as it is presented in his other, more strictly 
philosophical, works. The next section then focuses on providing a reading of The 
                                                            
2  Lawtoo, Nidesh,  The  Phantom  of  the  Ego: Modernism  and  the Mimetic Unconscious,  ed. Nidesh  Lawtoo, 
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 95. 
3 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 8. 
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Adventures of the Man in Gold and on showing how it functions as an attempt to 
dissolve the unitary conception of the self by means of the concept of the “double” or 
alter ego. This is followed by a brief discussion what I see as a parallel to the ego-
alter-ego duality explored in Shusterman’s book – the relationship between art and 
philosophy. I show that this duality, although addressed more directly in Shusterman’s 
other texts, finds distinctive expression in The Adventures of the Man in Gold’s hybrid 
form.  
 
The Death of the Subject: The Alter Ego as Challenge to the Unitary Concept of 
Self 
 
Humanism is perhaps one of the most significant expressions of the modern in the 
Western philosophical tradition. As Charles E. Scott4 points out, humanism 
engendered a kind of “theoretical hope” in the face of the harms that human beings 
inflict upon one another. This hope was presented in the form of a “scaffolding” for the 
“recognition of human identity across racial and cultural barriers” and for the values of 
human dignity and human rights.5 And yet, humanism was revealed by a number of 
thinkers as concealing within itself the seeds of colonialism, gender bias and fascism, 
specifically due to its impulse towards the value of universal truth and identity.6 As a 
result, the humanism of the modern was subjected to the critical gaze of the 
postmodern, which is, as Jean-François Lyotard puts it, an “incredulity” towards 
metanarratives.7 
 
The postmodern suspicion towards the grand stories expressed in modernity finds 
potent expression in Martin Heidegger’s pointed rejection of Descartes’ portrayal of 
human being as a rational mind situated in a material body, and as a transcendental 
                                                            
4 Scott, Charles E. “Postmodernism” in Columbia Companion to Twentieth‐Century Philosophies ed. Constantin 
V. Boundas (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007), 507‐8. 
5 Scott, Postmodernism, 508. 
6 Scott, Postmodernism, 508. 
7 With Shusterman, I read the “post” in postmodernism to point towards an extension of the modern by means 
of “critique,  inversion or subversion.” See Richard Shusterman, “Aesthetics and Postmodernism” The Oxford 
Handbook of Aesthetics. Edited by Jerrold Levinson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 771‐782, citation 
from page 775.  
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subject standing over and against objects that can be known in the world8. Heidegger 
challenges the Cartesian opposition, claiming that “… subject and object are not the 
same as Dasein and the world”9. Rather, in his view, “…in grasping something, Da-
sein does not first go outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated” 
since for him, “…in its primary kind of being, [Da-sein] is always already ‘outside’ 
together with some being encountered in the world already discovered”10. The 
Heideggerian “destruktion”11 of the ontology underlying twentieth century continental 
philosophy, combined with Nietzsche’s rejection of the traditional conceptions of 
universality and time by means of his genealogical strategy, provides the impetus for 
Michel Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approach. 
 
Foucault’s dissection of the grand narratives of knowledge and reason, and his 
exposure of the hidden forms of value and power within those accounts, turns on his 
rejection of the modern, humanistic concept of the subject as a unified subjectivity. 
Although a difficulty remains in terms of how to interpret and reconcile Foucault’s early 
insistence on “Man’s death” in the western “epistêmê”, and how subjects are 
“fabricated” and subjugated by disciplinary power, with his later development of an 
ethics based on aesthetic self-fashioning that advocates a “care of the self”12, 
Foucault’s fundamental critique of the idea of a unified and timeless subject is far-
reaching in its effect on philosophy in the twentieth century.  
 
                                                            
8 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 17th edition, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 89; translation from 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, SUNY Series  in Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: SUNY, 1996), 83. 
9 Heidegger, “Sein und Zeit,” 60; Heidegger, “Being and Time,” 56. 
10 Heidegger, “Sein und Zeit,” 62; Heidegger, “Being and Time,” 58. Although I cannot discuss this here, it must 
be noted that Heidegger’s position has been vigorously criticised, most notably by Jacques Derrida, who points 
out that Heidegger’s concept of Jemeinigkeit conceals “a singularity, an irreplaceability of that which remains 
nonsubstitutable in the structure of Dasein” and so which “risks pointing toward both the ego and an organic or 
atomic indivisibility”. See Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well” in Jacques Derrida, Points…Interviews 1974‐1994. Ed. 
by Elisabeth Weber, translated by Peggy Camuf and others. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995), 271. 
11 See my “From Destruktion  to Deconstruction: A Response  to Moran” South African  Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume 27 Number 1, 2008: 52‐68 for an extended discussion of Heidegger’s concept of destruktion and how it 
differs from Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction. 
12 I cannot discuss what I will call the “fabrication‐constitution” debate in any significant detail here. See Peter 
Dews, “The Return of the Subject in the Late Foucault,” Radical Philosophy 51 (1989): 37‐41; Rob Devos, “The 
Return of the Subject in Michel Foucault,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, 2 (2002): 255‐280 and 
Thomas Flynn, “Truth and Subjectivation  in the  later Foucault,” Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 531‐540 for 
excellent discussions of this important theme in the scholarship on Foucault.  
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Foucault’s “death of the subject” is taken up in the context of literature and art by 
Roland Barthes, for example. Barthes, in his “The Death of the Author,” (1977) argues 
that the reader of a text can exist only at the expense of the author: “the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”13 For Barthes, texts involve any 
aspect of culture that express the thoughts of a writer and so include books, 
periodicals, artworks and television. For Barthes, the traditional view of the Author is 
that the Author is “…the father and the owner of his work: literary science therefore 
teachers respect for the manuscript and the author’s declared intensions, while society 
asserts the legality of the relation of author to work (in the form of various copyright 
laws).”14 Barthes’ position stands in direct contradistinction to such a conception of an 
Author, and so constitutes yet another challenge to the modern idea of the subject.15 
The pervasiveness of this challenge is fittingly expressed by Slavoj Zizek, who opens 
his book The Ticklish Subject thus: “A spectre is haunting Western  academia [...] the 
spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic powers have entered into an unholy 
alliance to exorcise this spectre.”16 
 
The “exorcism” of the Cartesian conception of the subject as a fixed unity that I have 
briefly surveyed also appears in how the concept of the doppelgänger or alter ego has 
been employed within both philosophy and literature. Jacques Derrida, to name but 
one example, specifically mentions the alter ego in his discussion of the “problematic 
of the subject” that he asserts cannot be reduced to a homogeneity. He says: 
 
The alter ego can never be given “in person,” it resists the principle of 
principles of phenomenology – namely, the intuitive given of originary 
presence. This dislocation of the absolute subject from the other and 
from time neither comes about, nor leads beyond phenomenology, but 
rather, if not in it, then at least on its border, on the very line of its 
                                                            
13 Barthes, Roland, “The Death of the Author,” in Image‐Music‐Text, trans Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and 
Wand, 1977), 148. 
14 Roland Barthes, “From Work to text,” in Image‐Music‐Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York, Hill and Wang, 
1977), 160. 
15 I cannot provide an extended discussion of this here, but in my view, the poststructuralist insistence on the 
death of the subject, or the author, does not entail equating death with complete absence This is in line with 
the view of Dimitris Vardoulakis as expressed in The Doppelganger, (Fordham University Press, 2010), 1. 
16 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 1999). Zizek names 
feminists, New Age obscurantists, postmodern deconstructionists and deep ecologists as examples of trends 
that are all hostile to the Cartesian subject. 
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possibility. […] There has never been The Subject for anyone […]. The 
subject is a fable […] but to concentrate on the elements of speech and 
conventional fiction that such a fable presupposes is not to stop taking it 
seriously. […] 17 
 
As Derrida points out here, the alter ego is a concept that is resistant to the idea of 
originary presence, a notion that allows for the conception of a subject as absolute 
and unitary. Taking the “fable” of the subject seriously, as Derrida suggests here, is 
also evident in how the figure of the alter ego, “double” or the other self as a challenge 
to modern conceptions of the self emerges in the history of literature. The concept, 
rooted in Greek and Roman mythology, emerges as an especially significant theme in 
German literature of the Romantic Movement. The “double walker” or Doppelgänger 
is interpreted variously as a true double or twin, a split personality, or an alter ego, and 
has been used to represent a number of themes including, most significantly for this 
paper, the dual nature of human beings.18 Vardoulakis provides a fitting description of 
the doppelgänger or alter ego in this context as: 
 
[…] an operative or effective presence to the extent that it effects the 
undoing of the framing of the subject by the opposition between mere 
presence and absence. Such an operation indicates a function of 
relationality—the various relations that structure the subject’s ontology.19 
 
As such, in both the history of philosophy and in literature, the alter ego takes its place 
as an important challenge to the humanism of modernity that revolves around a very 
specific conception of the subject. Specifically, by introducing the alter ego in both 
literature and philosophy, the idea of an unchanging, unitary subject is called into 
question. How then does Shusterman’s somaesthetic approach contribute to this 
challenge? 
 
 
                                                            
17 Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well”, 263 ‐ 264. 
18  Deborah  Ascher  Barnstone  in  her  The  Doppelgänger,  (Peter  Lang  AG,  Internationaler  Verlag  der 
Wissenschaften, 2016) provides an extended discussion of the use of the concept in literature, film and other 
art forms that I cannot explore here. 
19 Vardoulakis, The Doppelganger, 1. 
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Shusterman on the Self and Subjectivity– a Somaesthetic Approach 
 
The “doubleness” that I will presently show is explored in The Adventures of the Man 
in Gold is a theme that Shusterman in fact identifies as characteristic of his own life. 
Long before the Man in Gold was born, Shusterman notes, in an autobiographical 
piece, that a doubleness is to be found in his bi-nationality, the fact that he completed 
a double major, was twice married with two sets of children, and in the fact that his 
philosophical roots that are to be found in both the analytic and continental traditions 
in philosophy.20 Yet these pluralities do not render the idea of the self empty or 
suspect, but rather that, in his view, they can be held together in a reasonably unified 
and stable field”.21  
 
The doubleness that Shusterman himself sees as characteristic of his life, and, most 
importantly, his contention that a self centred around “order, grace and harmony”22 is 
possible despite the postmodern suspicion against a “true” self, is also clearly evident 
in his philosophical writings on the self. Shusterman’s somaesthetic approach itself is 
explicitly a challenge to the Cartesian split of the self into mind and body.23 As he 
explains: 
 
The body-mind connection is so pervasively intimate that it seems misleading to 
speak of body and mind as two different, independent entities. The term body-
mind would more aptly express their essential union, which still leaves room for 
pragmatically distinguishing between mental and physical aspects of behavior 
and also for the project of increasing their experiential unity.24 
 
                                                            
20  Richard  Shusterman,  “Regarding  Oneself  and  Seeing  Double:  Fragments  of  Autobiography.”  In  The 
Philosophical I: Personal Reflections on Life  in Philosophy, edited by George Yancey, 1–21. (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2002), citation from page 5. 
21 Shusterman, “Regarding Oneself”, 5. Interestingly, this view is already present in Shusterman’s earlier critique 
of Richard Rorty in his “Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?” Theory, Culture and Society 5 
(1988): 337‐55. 
22 Shusterman, “Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?”, 348. 
23 I provide an extended discussion of Shusterman’s valorization of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty’s celebration of the 
body,  and  his  (problematic,  in  my  view)  criticism  of  Nietzsche’s  position  in  detail  in  my  “Nietzsche  on 
Embodiment: A Proto‐somaesthetics?” Studies in Somaesthetics. Eds. Richard Shusterman and Sandor Kremer. 
(Amsterdam, Brill‐Rodopi, forthcoming). 
24 Richard  Shusterman, Thinking  through  the Body, Educating  for  the Humanities: A Plea  for  Somaesthetics 
Journal of Aesthetic Education, 40 (1) (2006): 1‐21, citation from page 2. 
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So, although Shusterman admits that there is pragmatic need for a distinction between 
the mental and the physical, the body and mind are essentially one in his view. This is 
reflected in his definition of somaesthetics as: 
 
…devoted to the critical, ameliorative study of one's experience and use of one's 
body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-
fashioning. lt is therefore likewise devoted to the knowledge, discourses, 
practices and bodily disciplines that structure such somatic care or can improve 
it.25 
 
From his somaesthetic vantage point, Shusterman maintains that the concept of soma 
denotes not the mere physical body but the “lived, sentient, intentional, body that 
involves mental, social, and cultural dimensions.”26 As a result, Shusterman can avoid 
the indictments levelled against a heightened attention to the body in some other 
approaches. These approaches depend on conceiving somatics in terms of a 
“…reifying exteriorization of the body – the body as a mechanical instrument of 
atomised parts and measurable surfaces – rather than the body as a living dimension 
of individual experience and action.”27  
 
In addition, Shusterman posits the soma as a site of “intelligent, discriminating 
subjectivity”, as well as “unreflective spontaneity”.28 This means that in addition to 
somaesthetics rejecting the Cartesian view of the human being as split between a 
mind and a body by means of the notion of embodiment, the embodied self is seen as 
not merely rational, intelligent and discriminating, but also as encompassing and 
embracing the range of human emotion as being equally significant.  
 
However, as has already been mentioned, Shusterman’s rejection of the Cartesian 
self does not comprise an espousal of the idea of “…a tireless insatiable Faustian 
                                                            
25 Richard Shusterman, “Somaesthetics and the Body /Media Issue,” Body and Society 3 (3) (September 1997): 
33‐49, citation from 34. 
26 Richard Shusterman, “Soma, Self, And Society: Somaesthetics as Pragmatist Meliorism,” Metaphilosophy 42 
(3) (April 2011): 314‐327, citation from page 315. 
27 Richard Shusterman, Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives  for the ends of Art,  (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2000), 161. 
28 Shusterman, “Soma, Self and Society,” 315 
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quest for enriching titillation through curiosity and novelty, a quest that is as wide-
ranging as it is unstructured through the lack of centre it so celebrates.”29 Just as the 
poststructuralist insistence on the death of the subject (or the author) does not, in my 
view, have to entail equating that death with complete absence, so Shusterman’s 
somaesthetics does not encompass a complete rejection of the concept of self. As he 
explains: 
 
…the maximised spawning of alternative and often inconsistent vocabularies and 
narratives of the self, an aim which explicitly seeks to undermine the idea of the 
true self and replace it with an open, changing, growing, multiplicity of selves or 
self-descriptions, makes the whole idea of an integral enduring self seem 
completely empty and suspect. But without such a self that is capable of identity 
through change or changing description, there can be no self capable of self-
enrichment or enlargement…30 
 
In Shusterman’s view, serious consequences could result from the move towards 
denying the self’s very existence that he asserts has become a “dominant dogma” in 
both establishment and anti-establishment movements.31 He claims, for example, that 
by denying the existence and agency of the self, intellectuals seek to legitimate their 
“own political and social inaction, [their] unjustifiable and unhappy complacency, even 
[their] own responsibility for [their] own lives.”32 Although Shusterman is willing to admit 
the need for a “tolerance’ of ambiguity, alternative narratives, and alternative 
vocabularies, he rejects the “celebration and maximisation” of such things.33 Why? 
 
Shusterman draws on a reading of Nietzsche (as well as Emerson and Wittgenstein) 
to develop his call to give “style” to the self, an idea that is central to his somaesthetics. 
Although he acknowledges that Nietzsche’s own metaphysics “repudiates the idea of 
an individual having his ‘own true self’ that is fixed and autonomous”34, he rightly, I 
                                                            
29 Shusterman, “Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?”, 346. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 352. 
32 Shusterman, “Postmodernist Aestheticism,” 353. 
33  Richard  Shusterman,  “Deconstruction  and  Analysis:  Confrontation  and  Convergence,”  British  Journal  of 
Aesthetics 26.  
34 Shusterman, Performing Live, 211. 
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think, highlights the Nietzschean idea that the elements that make up that self can 
nonetheless be brought into a “dynamic, developing unity of tension.”35 In Nietzsche 
then, Shusterman finds a “doubling” of the self that includes what one already is, as 
well as what one can become,36 and so, the means to develop a somaesthetics that 
is able to exorcise the spectre of the transcendental subject, and yet accommodate 
his concern with “embodied self-care.”37 
 
How then does the Man in Gold reflect this challenge to the transcendental subject of 
modernity?  
 
Reading the Man in Gold as alter ego 
 
The Adventures of the Man in Gold engages with the theme of the double on multiple 
levels. The book’s text, for example, is presented in both French and English placed 
alongside one another on the pages. Right from the outset, this arrangement 
enhances the reader’s impression that she is “seeing double”.  
 
In addition to the doubling of language, the book contains both text and image, with 
Yann Toma’s striking photographs of the Man in Gold providing a “double” of the 
“adventures” related in the text. Toma’s photographic style that derives from Man 
Ray’s space writing38 can itself be seen as a play on the theme of the double, since 
the photographer’s “…lights needed darkness to work their magical energy on the Man 
in Gold”.39 The theme of light and dark is, of course, one that is significant within 
especially the literature on the doppelganger or alter ego, since the alter ego is often 
portrayed there as representative of “dark” forces as compared to the ego’s light-
ness.40 
 
                                                            
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 212. 
37 Ibid., 144. I reserve a discussion of whether Shusterman’s Nietzschean approach is able to succeed in this aim 
for another occasion, but my hunch is that it suffers from the same difficulties that are present when trying to 
reconcile Foucault’s earlier and later works as mentioned in an earlier footnote. 
38 For a discussion of Yann Toma’s photographic technique, Richard Shusterman’s Thinking through the Body: 
Essays in Somaesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239‐261. 
39 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 112. 
40 Here the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is perhaps the most well‐known example. See Richard Stevenson’s 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1886) for a discussion. 
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It is, however, in the figure of the Man in Gold that a very different portrayal of the 
traditional theme of the alter ego or double is brought into sharp relief. Shusterman 
tells us that the Man in Gold was born in the afternoon, on Saturday 12 June 2010 in 
the medieval abbey of Royaumont.41 As the book relates, the Man in Gold works with 
Yann Toma to transform “…an ordinary middle-aged philosopher into a golden work 
of art.” From the outset, the Man in Gold “profoundly and quite visibly unsettled”42 the 
sense of identity of the philosopher. Significantly, Shusterman points out that one of 
the key themes of the text is “…the instability and transformational potential of the self 
through the powers of possession.” As a result, without mentioning it directly, 
Shusterman already situates the Man in Gold within the history of literature and 
philosophy on the double or alter ego as challenge to the traditional idea of the subject 
as unitary.43 
 
Emerging silent44, as opposed to the philosopher, who relies on “dry, unimaginative 
philosophical prose”45, and clothed in a shimmering gold body suit, the Man in Gold is 
constantly contrasted with the figure of Shusterman, who narrates the book. The 
contrast is, however, one that is set up to express how the Man in Gold and 
Shusterman, are, “…like yin and yang, woman and man, earth and heaven, [and] 
darkness and light”, “…necessary synergetic complements.”46 As a result, the figure 
of the double or alter ego in the book highlights the idea that despite the fact that the 
idea of a unitary and autonomous self is “largely illusory”, aspects of that self can 
indeed be brought into a beautiful harmony, despite the risks this entails.47 
 
In Shusterman’s view, this has important aesthetic and somaesthetic effects, since by 
“inhabiting and transforming” Shusterman’s soma, the Man in Gold allows the 
philosopher “new capacities and avenues of aesthetic experience.”48 So the light and 
dark contrast between the Man in Gold and Shusterman as philosopher is transformed 
                                                            
41 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 17. 
42 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 18. 
43 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 8. 
44  Shusterman  calls  the Man  in Gold  “a philosopher without words”  and  sees himself  as his  “philosophical 
spokesman.” (Shusterman, Man in Gold, 19). 
45 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 14. 
46 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 112. 
47 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 8. 
48 Ibid. 
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into the synergy that can exist between the aesthetic and the cognitive aspects of the 
self. My contention here finds support in Shusterman’s discussion of the three factors 
driving what brought the Man in Gold to him. When discussing the first factor, he notes 
that artists generally expressed dissatisfaction with his explanation of how 
somaesthetics applies to contemporary art. Shusterman’s response – “…that the 
soma (with its sensory, motor, and affective resources) is the medium through which 
we both create and appreciate works of art and that therefore improved somatic 
mastery could generate better aesthetic experience” was not enough of a concrete 
and practical application of his theory in contemporary artistic creation.49 The Man in 
Gold was to allow for a concrete and practical exploration of Shusterman’s conception 
of aesthetic experience.  
 
The second factor Shusterman mentions also supports my contention here. As he 
explains, like most philosophy of art, his theory is “…dominated by the observer’s or 
interpreter’s point of view” and so would be more complete by including the artist’s 
experience.50 Once again, the Man in Gold became a means to interrogate the 
theoretical difficulties Shusterman grapples with in his more strictly philosophical 
works – here, the question of the experience of the artist in aesthetic theory. 
 
The Man in Gold, who “…eschews discursive language, recognizing it as the glory of 
philosophy but also an imprisoning source of its oppressive folly – its one-sidedness”51; 
who is driven by both the love of beauty, and the love of knowledge in the sense of a 
curiosity to learn through immediate sensuous experience52; and who is animated by 
both love and fear; becomes an expression of Shusterman’s contention that the self 
cannot be reduced to the unitary, rational, free and self-controlled subject. However, 
this does not mean that as alter ego, the Man in Gold dissolves the idea of the self in 
its entirety. As the book relates, the Man in Gold and Shusterman become the 
“necessary synergetic complements” that allow, in Nietzsche’s sense thereof, for the 
philosopher to give “style” to his character.  
 
                                                            
49 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 9 
50 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 10 
51 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 58 
52 Shusterman, Man in Gold, 60 
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Reading the Man in Gold: Philosophy and Art 
The doubling explored in terms of the theme of alter ego in the book can also be read 
as an implicit commentary on the nature of the relationship between philosophy and 
art more generally. As Shusterman explains in another text: 
 
Contrary to traditional philosophy, from the somaesthetic philosophical 
perspective, knowledge of the world is improved not by denying our bodily 
senses but by perfecting them. Experience […] remains the vital heart of 
philosophy.53  
 
In his view then, art and philosophy can and should be brought into productive and 
mutually illuminating contact. This is based on his contention that “philosophy should 
be transformational instead of foundational” since “[i]mproved experience, not 
originary truth, is the ultimate philosophical goal and criterion.”54 Philosophy then 
becomes more than mere theory in Shusterman’s recalling of the ancient idea of 
philosophy as an embodied practice. Shusterman specifies the way in which art and 
life should be conceived from his pragmatic viewpoint thus: 
 
My pragmatism argues against the traditional Western division between art and 
life that has led to art's marginalization from ethical self-cultivation and political 
praxis; it instead urges more continuity between art and life by refining life 
aesthetically with artistic skill to make one's life a work of art. But in doing so, it 
does not deny that there is a difference between art and ordinary life and that 
this difference is important. It is arguing only against certain sharp divisions 
between art and life that have been drawn by philosophers and that have been 
damaging to the role art has played in Western culture55.  
 
With its hybrid form, bringing together philosophy and art (in the form of literature and 
photography conceived of as performance), Shusterman’s The Adventures of the Man 
                                                            
53  Richard  Shusterman,  “Dewey  on  Experience:  Foundation  or  Reconstruction?”  Philosophical  Forum  26  (2) 
(1994):127–148, citation from page148. 
54  Richard  Shusterman,  “Somatic  Experience:  Foundation  or  Reconstruction?”  Practicing  Philosophy: 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (London: Routledge, 2016), n.p. 
55 Richard Shusterman, “Aesthetics as Philosophy of Art and Life,” JTLA 37 (2012): 1‐6, citation from page 2 
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in Gold: Paths between Art and Life expressed this assertion in a concrete and 
practical way, once again playing with and between the concept of the double. 
Conclusion 
The Man in Gold stands as a daring expression of Shusterman’s 
Nietzschean/Foucauldian impulse to live life one’s as a work of art. As I have shown 
in this paper, Shusterman’s hybrid work can be read as a dual challenge to philosophy: 
first, a challenge to the tradition of the subject understood as unitary, rational, free and 
self-controlled; and second, as a challenge to the tradition of understanding philosophy 
as juxtaposed to art. Shusterman’s work reminds us that the ego can no longer be 
contained within a single, homogeneous, and unitary frame, but aims to exorcise this 
spectre and the metaphysics it entails in a way that nonetheless allows for the 
embodied self-care that is characteristic of his somaesthetics. In addition, as a daring 
work that dances over the lines so strictly drawn between philosophy, art, and 
literature, The Man in Gold provides a concrete and practical application of 
Shusterman’s theory, and so likewise challenges the strict divisions between 
philosophy and art. As such, it provides, in my reading, a thought-provoking 
experience for philosophers and artists alike. 
